 |


|
 |
Item Details
Title:
|
TRUTH IN VIRTUE OF MEANING
A DEFENCE OF THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION |
By: |
Gillian Russell |
Format: |
Hardback |

List price:
|
£70.00 |
Our price: |
£61.25 |
Discount: |
|
You save:
|
£8.75 |
|
|
|
|
ISBN 10: |
0199232199 |
ISBN 13: |
9780199232192 |
Availability: |
Usually dispatched within 1-3 weeks.
Delivery
rates
|
Stock: |
Currently 0 available |
Publisher: |
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS |
Pub. date: |
28 February, 2008 |
Pages: |
256 |
Description: |
The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences - the idea that some sentences are true or false just in virtue of what they mean - is a famous focus of philosophical controversy. Gillian Russell reinvigorates the debate with a challenging new defence of the distinction, showing that it is compatible with semantic externalism. |
Synopsis: |
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. This distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way. One can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many twentieth-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense, and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments of Quine and his supporters. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language.Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language - semantic externalism - on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. In Truth in Virtue of Meaning, Gillian Russell argues that it hasn't. Using the tools of contemporary philosophy of language, she outlines a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. She then goes on to draw out the surprising epistemological consequences of her approach. |
Publication: |
UK |
Imprint: |
Oxford University Press |
Returns: |
Returnable |
|
|
|
 |


|

|

|

|

|
Little Worried Caterpillar (PB)
Little Green knows she''s about to make a big change - transformingfrom a caterpillar into a beautiful butterfly. Everyone is VERYexcited! But Little Green is VERY worried. What if being a butterflyisn''t as brilliant as everyone says?Join Little Green as she finds her own path ... with just a littlehelp from her friends.

|

|
All the Things We Carry PB
What can you carry?A pebble? A teddy? A bright red balloon? A painting you''ve made?A hope or a dream?This gorgeous, reassuring picture book celebrates all the preciousthings we can carry, from toys and treasures to love and hope. With comforting rhymes and fabulous illustrations, this is a warmhug of a picture book.

|

|
|
 |