| Synopsis: |
During the last 25 years there has been a widespread move toward more market-oriented policies and institutions across the developing and former socialist countries, usually in the context of more politically open societies. The most remarkable fact of this movement is that while policies have often been quite similar, results have been very different. Thirty-one country studies, relying heavily on a political economy analysis, were undertaken to try to understand these divergent results. In this book the findings of these studies are synthesized on a regional and global basis. The syntheses show that even when reforms follow 'Washington Consensus' type recommendations quite closely, on entering the arena of political economy, they are often greatly transformed or diluted. In short, the country can be caught in a political economy trap in which the prime motivation behind the reforms is to strengthen the benefits to specific, usually elite groups. Some strong impetus, often external, is needed to break out of this trap.Even a reform that appears successful can be unsustainable, if it is perceived as illegitimate or undertaken in the context of a polity that is unable to strengthen cooperation, because it may result in popular resistance, changes in governments, the lack of collective learning ability, or simply reform fatigue. |